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resource allocation decisions. It assesses whether the health gains
offered by an intervention are large enough relative to any additional
costs to warrant adoption. When there are constraints on the health
care system’s budget or ability to increase expenditures, additional
costs imposed by interventions have an “opportunity cost” in terms of
the health foregone because other interventions cannot be provided.
Cost-effectiveness thresholds (CETs) are typically used to assess
whether an intervention is worthwhile and should reﬂect health
opportunity cost. Nevertheless, CETs used by some decision makers
—such as the World Health Organization that suggested CETs of 1 to 3
times the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita—do not. Objec-
tives: To estimate CETs based on opportunity cost for a wide range of
countries. Methods: We estimated CETs based on recent empirical
estimates of opportunity cost (from the English National Health
Service), estimates of the relationship between country GDP per capita
and the value of a statistical life, and a series of explicit assumptions.
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ondence to: Beth Woods, Centre for Health Economthe world), Cambodia (with borderline low/low-middle income), El
Salvador (with borderline low-middle/upper-middle income), and
Kazakhstan (with borderline high-middle/high income) were esti-
mated to be $3 to $116 (1%–51% GDP per capita), $44 to $518 (4%–
51%), $422 to $1967 (11%–51%), and $4485 to $8018 (32%–59%),
respectively. Conclusions: To date, opportunity-cost-based CETs
for low-/middle-income countries have not been available.
Although uncertainty exists in the underlying assumptions, these
estimates can provide a useful input to inform resource allocation
decisions and suggest that routinely used CETs have been
too high.
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Policymakers in all health care systems face difﬁcult choices
about which interventions, programs, or activities (hereinafter
referred to solely as “interventions”) should be funded from
limited available resources. The tools of economic evaluation
offer various means to assist policymakers in the process of
prioritization. A common approach is the incremental cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA), which is based on the comparative
assessment of costs and beneﬁts, with the latter generally
focused on health gains. CEA seeks to identify which interven-
tions offer health gains large enough, relative to their costs, to
warrant adoption [1].
CEA typically includes detailed information about the incre-
mental costs (Δcosts) and the incremental health effects
(Δhealth) of an intervention relative to alternative interventions.
The results of CEA are often expressed as an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER), the ratio of incremental costs to
incremental health effects (Δcosts/Δhealth) [1]. Health effectsare often represented as quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs)
gained or disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) averted, and so
the ICER gives the “cost per QALY gained/DALY averted” asso-
ciated with an intervention. Although these are useful summa-
ries, the question remains as to whether a particular cost per
QALY gained/DALY averted ought to lead to the evaluated
intervention being considered cost-effective.
If an intervention offers incremental health gains but at some
additional costs, then a decision regarding whether it should be
funded should be informed by the value of what will be given up
as a consequence of those costs (i.e., the opportunity cost of
funding the intervention [2]). All systems face some restrictions
on the resources available for health care. If resources are
committed to the funding of one intervention, then they are
not available to fund and deliver others. The opportunity cost of a
commitment of resources is, therefore, the health forgone
because these “other” interventions that are available to the
health system cannot be delivered. Even if additional resources
are placed into the health care system to be made available for aociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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resources—the health that could have been gained by investing
these additional resources elsewhere in the system.
In the context of CEA, the opportunity cost can be expressed
using a cost-effectiveness threshold (CET). CETs based on oppor-
tunity costs describe the amount of money that, if removed from
the health care system, would result in one less unit of health
being generated, or equivalently, the cost of generating health in
the present system. In the case of the introduction of a new
intervention that imposes additional costs on the system, this is
equivalent to a marginal reduction in the resources available for
other activities. If the ICER (cost per QALY gained/DALY averted)
is less than the CET, it means that diverting funds to the
intervention will increase population health. For example, if the
CET is $1000/QALY and the ICER for an intervention is $100/QALY,
then for every $1000 spent on the intervention 1 QALY is lost in
the wider health care system but 10 are gained from the new
intervention. The net health effect is positive. Therefore, if an
ICER is less than the CET, an intervention can be considered cost-
effective, but if an ICER is more than the CET, the beneﬁts are
insufﬁcient in comparison with costs and the intervention cannot
be considered to be cost-effective. Hence, CEA simpliﬁes to an
assessment of whether a new intervention will result in gains in
population health and the inverse of the CET should reﬂect the
marginal product of health care spending (Δhealth/Δcosts).
Estimating the opportunity cost of health care spending (i.e.,
estimating the CET) is, therefore, a crucial aspect of any resource
allocation decision in health care.
Understanding CETs
Recent methods research has emphasized the centrality of
opportunity costs in informing resource allocation decisions
and how CETs can be appropriately estimated for CEA to inform
decisions aimed at improving population health [3,4] (see (Chap-
ter 4 of Drummond et al. [1] for a full overview). A clear
distinction needs to be made between two related, but separate,
concepts that have informed the debate regarding the most
appropriate value for the CET: 1) opportunity costs in terms of
health foregone when costs fall on health care budgets and 2)
opportunity costs in terms of foregone consumption (the “con-
sumption value of health”) when additional costs fall on con-
sumption opportunities outside health care. The ﬁrst is an issue
of “fact,” resulting from limits in the overall collective budget
available for health care or constraints on the health system’s
abilities to increase expenditure. It reﬂects the health generated
at present from the health care system (or that could be gained if
expenditure were increased) and, therefore, reﬂects the “supply
side” of the system. The second is an issue of “value” and
depends on how individuals and society value health as com-
pared with other forms of consumption or publicly funded non-
health goods. This indicates what individuals and society want
from the health care system, or the “demand side.”
For economic evaluation it is important to consider what type
of opportunity costs would result from investment in new
activities. If opportunity costs result in the form of health forgone
(e.g., through displacement of other health-generating interven-
tions), then the CET should reﬂect this (let’s denote this as “k,”
the amount of money that would displace one QALY’s worth of
health care investment). If opportunity costs are in terms of other
forms of consumption, then the CET should reﬂect the consump-
tion value of health (let’s denote this as “v”).
If we observe that the consumption value of health is higher
than the amount of health care resource required to improve
health (i.e., if v 4 k), then this suggests that the health care
system is not meeting individual preferences. Individuals would
be willing to give up more of the resources available to them toimprove their own health than the health care system would
require. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case,
not least the welfare losses associated with socially acceptable
ways to ﬁnance health care systems and the fact that individuals
may be willing to expend more resources in improving their own
health than in improving the health of others via a collectively
funded system.
For incremental CEA to inform the allocation of health care
expenditures, for which the primary purpose is generally
regarded as being the generation of health from limited collective
health care resources, CETs reﬂecting the opportunity costs of
health care spending (k) will always be required if there are any
restrictions on the growth in health care expenditure (see
Chapter 4 of Drummond et al. [1]).
Estimating Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds
CETs have not generally been set to reﬂect k. For instance, values
of £20,000 to £30,000 and $50,000 have commonly been applied in
the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively [5,6].
Similarly, for low- and middle-income countries, the World
Health Organization (WHO) has recommended thresholds of 1
to 3 times the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita [7]. These
values are not based on assessment of health opportunity costs
resulting from resource constraints. The basis for these thresh-
olds is unclear; they, however, appear to have been conceptually
and to some degree empirically informed by the consumption
value of health (or more accurately, estimates of individuals’
willingness to pay [WTP] to improve their own health). For
instance, the WHO threshold is described as being based on
estimates reported in the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health report from 2001 [8]. These estimates were intended to
inform decisions regarding overall investments in health care
spending and used estimates of the WTP for mortality risk
reductions. Indeed, similar approaches continue to be used to
advocate for increased health care spending [9]. Nevertheless, the
use of these thresholds when assessing the value of individual
interventions in the context of existing spending limits is not
consistent with population health improvement, because they do
not reﬂect the opportunity costs that are imposed on health care
systems. Although demand-side thresholds might inform social
choices about the magnitude of ﬁnancial resources committed to
health care, they are inappropriate measures of health oppor-
tunity cost and so risk reducing, rather than increasing, popula-
tion health when used in the context of CEA.
Alternatively, the relationship between changes in health care
expenditure and health outcomes—the marginal productivity of
the health care system in generating health—can be estimated.
This provides a direct measure of the health consequence of
changes in available resources, for example, when a cost-
escalating intervention is adopted or what could be gained if
additional resources are made available in general to fund health
care. Using such estimates of k to inform CETs provides a basis
for informing resource allocation decisions with a view to
increasing population health. There is, however, a paucity of
estimates of CETs using these approaches. One notable exception is
in the study by Claxton et al. [4] which used local-level program
expenditure data, in a range of disease areas, to estimate the
relationship between changes in health care expenditure and
health outcomes in the English National Health Service (NHS) (see
Chapter 4 of Drummond et al. [1] for a full description of this work).
By exploiting the variation in expenditure and in mortality
outcomes, Claxton et al. estimated the relationship between
changes in spending and mortality in those clinical program
areas in which a mortality effect could be identiﬁed while
accounting for endogeneity. With additional information about
age and sex of the patient population, these mortality effects
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 9 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 9 2 9 – 9 3 5 931were expressed as a cost per life-year threshold (£25,241 per life-
year). These life-year effects were adjusted for quality of life
using additional information about quality-of-life norms by age
and sex as well as the quality-of-life impacts of different types of
disease. By using the effect of expenditure on the mortality and
life-year burden of disease as a surrogate for the effects on a
more complete measure of health burden (i.e., which includes
quality-of-life burden), a cost per QALY threshold was estimated.
This was subject to parameter and structural uncertainty, but a
central estimate of £12,936 per QALY was reported [4].
There is growing recognition of the need for estimates of k that
reﬂect opportunity costs in terms of health to inform resource
allocation decisions in low-, middle-, and high-income countries
[10,11]. Nevertheless, with the exception of the work by Claxton
et al., there is a lack of empirically based estimates of k. This article
draws out the implications of what the limited available evidence
suggests about supply-side CETs (ks) in a range of jurisdictions. We
return to the subject of how these estimates might be used to
inform resource allocation decisions in the Discussion section.t socro
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Fig. 1 – Method for inferring country-speciﬁc cost-
effectiveness thresholds from the UK threshold.Methods
The estimate of k by Claxton et al. [4] is based on the estimates of
the marginal productivity of health care spending in just one
jurisdiction. In principle, a similar approach could be adopted to
estimate the relationship between health care spending and
health outcomes internationally, using countries as units of
analysis, to determine k in a wide range of settings.
To date, however, cross-country evidence on the productivity
of health care spending has focused on answering the question
“Does health care spending improve health outcomes?” Recent
research adjusting for potential reverse causality in this relation-
ship (e.g., the possibility of governments spending more when
health outcomes are worse) suggests that the answer to this
question is yes [12]. The available literature, however, does not
focus on how the effect of health care spending on health
outcomes varies according to the level of health care spending
or country income. The available analyses do suggest that the
marginal productivity of health care spending diminishes with
increasing health care spending or country income [13–15]. This
indicates that the threshold varies with country income or health
care spending and reﬂects our expectation that the amount of
health displaced by new resource commitments decreases as
country income or health care spending rises. There is, however,
little information to quantify how the marginal productivity of
health care spending varies with country income.
There is a body of literature that estimates v (the consumption
value of health or the demand-side threshold) in different
countries. Some of this literature is based on stated-preference
elicitation of individuals’ WTP for morbidity-adjusted life-years
(e.g., QALYs) [16,17], but a larger body of work estimates the
“value of a statistical life” (VSL) by estimating individuals’ WTP
for mortality reductions (e.g., by estimating wage compensation
for on-the-job risk exposure) [18,19]. Moreover, this literature also
examines how the VSL varies across jurisdictions as a function of
national per capita income (i.e., the elasticity of the VSL with
respect to income, ε). This potentially provides information about
the income elasticity of v if we can assume that the income
elasticity of the VSL is equal to the income elasticity of the value
of a life-year, and this, in turn, is equal to the income elasticity of
the value of a morbidity-adjusted life-year (e.g., QALY). For this to
be the case across countries, a VSL must convert to the same
number of QALYs across countries.
Understanding the income elasticity of v across countries
raises an interesting prospect. If a similar income elasticity of k
exists as for v, income elasticities of the VSL can be applied to theClaxton et al. estimate of k for the English NHS to provide
estimates of k in a wide range of jurisdictions. For the income
elasticity of k to equal that of v requires the ratio between k and v
to. We follow this approach to provide estimates of k for
application in different countries on the basis of their per capita
income levels, the CET for the English NHS, the per capita income
in the United Kingdom, and the elasticity of VSL with respect to
income.
This approach is illustrated in Figure 1 and, in summary,
requires the following three assumptions: 1) that the relative
discrepancy between v and k is constant across countries; 2) that
the values used for k and ε are appropriate estimates; and 3) that
the income elasticity of the VSL equals the income elasticity of
the consumption value of a QALY. These assumptions are
examined in the Discussion section. Nevertheless, we note that
the broad expectation that both v and k will increase with
country income is uncontentious. As income increases, basic
consumption needs are met and individuals become more willing
to exchange income for health (v), and health care spending
expands accordingly. As income and health care expenditure rise,
the marginal productivity of health care spending diminishes (k
increases). Our model requires that health care spending
increases such that the predicted increase in k is observed. We,
however, make no assumptions regarding how the expansion to
health care is funded. It could be funded via an expansion to the
tax base, a redistribution of the tax base, or a combination of
the two.
The best available estimate of the UK CET is £12,936 per QALY
($18,609 purchasing power parity [PPP]-adjusted [20]). The GDP
per capita estimates for 2013 were obtained from the World Bank
data set. In line with the literature on the VSL, elasticities were
applied to countries’ GDP per capita adjusted for PPP [21] (see, e.g.,
Milligan et al. [22]). CETs are reported in 2013 PPP-adjusted US
dollar values. Values without PPP adjustment are also provided
alongside non–PPP-adjusted GDP [23]. We use data on the ratio of
the PPP conversion factor to the market exchange rate to remove
the PPP adjustment but retain the presentation in US dollars [24].Estimates of Income Elasticity for Demand for Health
The relationship between the VSL and per capita income at the
level of jurisdictions is investigated in a small but emerging
literature [19,22,25]. The literature has evolved out of a longer
standing body of work that has examined the relationship
between income and health valuation at the level of individuals
(i.e., “within” countries) [18,25]. Of central interest in both these
bodies of work (i.e., within-group, at the individual level, and
between-group, at the level of jurisdictions) is the income
elasticity of the value of health.
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income countries among individuals, and most often in the
United States, suggested elasticities in the range of 0.4 to 0.6
[18,19]. These estimates came mainly from cross-sectional stud-
ies looking at wage-risk premiums. The estimates, however, have
been described as “nonsensical” when extrapolated to lower
income countries because the corresponding VSL would be
beyond the ranges considered plausible [19].
The methods to estimate the income elasticities of VSL have,
therefore, been more carefully scrutinized in more recent years.
In particular, cross-sectional (within-group) estimates from ear-
lier studies have been contrasted with longitudinal or cohort
(between-group) studies (which typically estimate elasticities 41
even within countries) and reasons for inconsistencies have been
explored [19,25,26]. For instance, Aldy and Smyth [26] used a life-
cycle model applied to US data on the consumption and labor
supply choices faced by individuals with uncertain life expect-
ancy and wage income to explain this discrepancy. They argued
that cross-sectional studies are more likely to capture changes in
realized income, whereas longitudinal or across cohort studies
capture the impact of permanent income (i.e., reﬂecting lifetime
opportunities to generate income), which is more informative
when translating VSL estimates across countries. Estimates of
elasticity with respect to realized income are lower because
realized income is more variable.
The recent consensus then is that the income elasticity of VSL
to transfer estimates across countries should be more than 1
[19,22]. A range of elasticities were selected for this analysis (1.0,
1.5, and 2.0) to reﬂect uncertainty in the literature. On the basis of
the study by Milligan et al. [22], a function of an elasticity of 0.7
was also applied for high-income countries (those with GDP per
capita 4$10,725, 2005 price year, PPP), and of 2.5 for countries
with per capita incomes less than this threshold. In line with the
recommendations by Milligan et al., the elasticities from this
study were applied to 2013 PPP-adjusted GDP, deﬂated to reﬂect
2005 international dollars. The resulting threshold values were
then inﬂated to reﬂect 2013 international dollars.Results
Predicted CETs across country income levels are shown in
Figure 2 for a range of income elasticities for the VSL. Higher
income elasticities imply lower CETs in countries with lower GDPper capita and higher CETs in countries with higher GDP per
capita compared with the United Kingdom. The impact of alter-
native choices of elasticity is larger because the discrepancy
between the GDP of the country of interest and the UK GDP
widens. Results for a selection of speciﬁc countries are presented
in Table 1.
US dollar CET values with and without PPP adjustment are
provided in the Supplemental Materials found at http://doi:10.
1016/10.1016/j.jval.2016.02.017 for all countries for which data
were available from the World Bank database for 2013. Values
without adjustment for PPP can be converted to local currency
using standard exchange rates.
As exemplar countries, for Malawi (the country with the
lowest per capita income in the world), Cambodia (with border-
line low and low-middle income), El Salvador (with borderline
low-middle and upper-middle income), and Kazakhstan (with
borderline high-middle and high income), CETs were estimated
to be $3 to $116 (1%–51% GDP per capita), $44 to $518 (4%–51% GDP
per capita), $422 to $1967 (11%–51% GDP per capita), and $4485 to
$8018 (33%–59% GDP per capita), respectively. For Luxembourg
(the country with the highest per capita income in the world), we
estimated a CET of $43,092 to $143,342 (39%–129% GDP per capita).Discussion
Policymakers in all countries, whether classiﬁed as high-,
middle-, or low-income countries, face difﬁcult decisions about
how to allocate scarce health care resources. CEA offers a means
by which to compare the costs and health gains from interven-
tions as a basis to inform investment decisions. For the results of
CEA to align with population health improvement, health gains
from recommended interventions must exceed the health fore-
gone when resources are committed to those interventions. CETs
should therefore reﬂect our best estimates of the opportunity cost
of health care spending (k) and not the consumption value of
health (v).
In this article we provided indicative estimates of CETs on the
basis of opportunity costs (the ks) in a number of countries that
are intended to reﬂect the likely marginal productivity of their
health care systems. Because of the lack of attention paid to
estimating k in the literature to date, the estimates are based on
limited data and strong, uncertain assumptions. The estimated
CETs are substantially lower than those used at present by
Table 1 – Example results for a range of countries and the World Bank income classiﬁcation cutoffs (2013 GDP
per capita).
Country/income
classiﬁcation
PPP-adjusted (2013 US $) Actual values (2013 US $) Threshold as %
GDP per capita
GDP per
capita
Threshold
range*
GDP per
capita
Threshold
range*
Country
Malawi 780 9–401 226 3–116 1–51
Indonesia 9,559 1,298–4,914 3,475 472–1,786 14–51
Chile 21,911 6,819–13,141 15,732 4,896–9,436 31–60
Kazakhstan 23,206 7,648–13,675 13,610 4,485–8,018 33–59
United Kingdom 36,197 18,609–18,609 41,787 20,223–20,223 48–48†
Canada 43,247 21,051–26,564 51,958 25,292–31,915 49–61
United States 53,143 24,283–40,112 53,042 24,283–40,112 46–75
Norway 65,461 28,057–60,862 100,819 43,211–93,736 43–93
Income classiﬁcation
Low/middle income‡ 1,045 16–537 NA NA 1–51
Middle/high income‡ 12,746 2,307–9,028 NA NA 18–71
GDP, gross domestic product; NA, not available/applicable; PPP, purchasing power parity.
* Reﬂects range of values obtained when using elasticity estimates of 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, and 2.5 for GDP less than $10,725 (2005 PPP US $) and 0.7 for
GDP greater than $10,725 (2005 PPP US $).
† For the United Kingdom, the World Bank ratio of PPP conversion factor to market exchange rate did not correspond to the ratio of reported
actual GDP to reported PPP-adjusted GDP. The threshold as a % GDP value for the United Kingdom, therefore, depends on whether PPP-
adjusted or actual data are used (51% and 48%, respectively).
‡ We have assumed gross national income per capita to be the same as PPP-adjusted GDP. These values relate to the income cutoffs for low- to
middle-income and middle- to high-income countries as deﬁned by the World Bank.
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pared with a threshold of $50,000 per QALY that has been
conventionally applied in the United States [5], our approach
estimated a CET in the range $24,283 to $40,112 per QALY. Even
more starkly, the thresholds we estimated were far less than the
1 to 3 times GDP per capita suggested by the WHO for use in low-
and middle-income countries [7,8]. In the country with the lowest
income in the world, Malawi, we estimated a CET of $3 to $116
(1%–51% GDP per capita), and in Kazakhstan, a country on the
borderline between being a middle- and a high-income country,
we estimated a CET of $4485 to $8018 (33%–59% GDP per capita).
This implies that resource allocation decisions based on WHO
thresholds are likely to be recommending interventions that can
lead to reductions in population health.
A separate question is how the estimates of k should be used
by health care decision makers. It is argued here that under-
standing the full net health effects of an intervention is essential.
Decision makers must understand not only the magnitude of
direct health gains from an intervention but also the health that
is expected to be displaced by the intervention costs. An under-
standing of what the health effects of increasing or reducing
health expenditure are likely to be (a supply-side threshold, k) is
therefore necessary if social and political choices regarding
resource allocation are to be made in an informed and account-
able way. It is clear, therefore, that in estimating the full net
health effects of an intervention, only those costs that fall on the
health care budget should be included. This approach should,
however, never be considered as a single decision-making rule,
and instead should be an input into a wider decision-making
process that is likely to include a range of additional consider-
ations including important social value judgments and appro-
priate consideration of the effects decisions are likely to have
outside of health (e.g., impact on ﬁnancial protection). Never-
theless, understanding the opportunity cost on health of using
these additional considerations is important to guide decisions.
Indeed, in the context of a ﬁnancially constrained health care
system, any widening of the measure of beneﬁt that informsdecisions should also be reﬂected in terms of opportunity costs
(e.g., to what extent will the ﬁnancial protection beneﬁts of
alternative interventions be foregone).
Estimates of the consumption value of health (v) have no role
in decisions regarding the allocation of the scarce available
resources for delivering health care [1]. Estimates of the con-
sumption value of health may have a role in informing the social
choice of what level of resources should be devoted to health
care. Nevertheless, estimates of individuals’ willingness to trade
off personal consumption for the collective health gains of
increased health care spending might be more useful for this. It
is not clear whether any study to date has estimated this
quantity.
The results presented rely on some core assumptions if they
are to provide reasonable estimates of the marginal productivity
of other (non-UK) health care systems. The plausibility of each
assumption is considered in turn.
1. That the discrepancy between the consumption value of
health (v) and the CET for health (k) is constant in relative
terms across countries:
It is assumed that the proportionate “underfunding” of health
care, through collectively pooled resources relative to individual
preferences over consumption and health, is constant across
countries.
The ratio between k and v is in fact likely to differ across
country income levels. The most obvious reason for this is
that health care budgets may differ across countries for
reasons other than differences in valuations of health. In
lower income countries, the size of the health care budget
is likely to be constrained by the ability of countries to raise
tax revenues. The difﬁculties faced by low-income coun-
tries in raising tax are well documented and include the
presence of a large informal sector, the impact of aid on
the size of the state, poor checks and balances that reduce
the likelihood of common-interest spending, interest
groups reducing the propensity to tax, low support for
higher taxation due to perceptions of corruption, and the
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This is likely to create a downward pressure on the health
care budget (not reﬂected in our analysis) that will cause k
to be lower than we predict. As well as having implications
for k, the reduced size of the health care system may result
in a greater demand for private health care spending.
There may also be constraints on the ability of countries
to allocate the available tax base to health as opposed to
other state-funded programs.
In lower income countries, and particularly for the
poorest countries, donor funding may represent a signiﬁ-
cant component of health care spending. The available
evidence supports some substitution of donor funding for
government health spending, although the substitution is
partial [28]. The net effect of donor funding is, therefore,
expected to increase public health care spending and
therefore raise k.
Depending on whether the restrictions on health care
expenditure and the inﬂux of donor funding increase or
decrease the budget beyond what it would otherwise be, k
may be smaller or larger than predicted by this analysis.
2. That the UK estimate of k is correct and that the range of
income elasticities (1–2) explored includes the correct value:
A recent systematic review [29] identiﬁed additional
studies estimating the impact of health expenditure on
health outcomes. Two of these studies were by Martin
et al. [30,31] and were precursors to the Claxton et al.
work [4]. Lichtenberg [32] developed a production function
for mortality reductions using US data. In this model,
health is generated by using health care expenditures of
previous years and the stock of medical innovations. The
methods used, however, do not allow us to disentangle the
impact of time trends in expenditure from other temporal
inﬂuences on health and, therefore, are unlikely to provide
a robust estimate of k.
The UK estimate of k is ﬁrmly founded on empirical
estimation of the effect of changes in expenditure on
mortality outcomes while accounting for endogeneity.
The assumptions and judgment required are summarized
in Table 32 of the study by Claxton et al. [33], which also
provides links to text and footnotes in which the qualita-
tive effect of these assumptions are examined in greater
detail. The analysis made use of the best available existing
evidence and, if anything, is more likely to be conservative
than optimistic with respect to the health effects of
changes in NHS expenditure, that is, is more likely to have
overestimated rather than underestimated the UK thresh-
old [34].
A range of values for the elasticity of the VSL (ε) was
considered, informed by the literature; it should, however,
be noted that there is little robust data on what value ε
should take. Furthermore, expressions of WTP for individ-
ual health gains may differ markedly from individuals’
willingness to trade consumption for collective health
gains, further increasing the uncertainty around the
estimates used.
3. That the income elasticity of WTP for a QALY can be
approximated by ε:
For the income elasticity of the VSL to equal the income
elasticity of the WTP for a QALY, a statistical life saved
should provide the same units of morbidity-adjusted
health (e.g., QALYs) across countries. This could be ques-
tioned if lives saved were expected to generate very differ-
ent remaining morbidity-adjusted life expectancies.
Although life expectancy at birth varies considerably
across countries, remaining life expectancy differs much
less because of differences in age demographiccharacteristics. For example, Hammitt and Robinson [19]
ﬁnd remaining life expectancies of between 34 and 45
years in countries with widely varying per capita incomes.
This is a result of much older populations in countries with
higher life expectancies at birth. Although quality of life is
likely to increase with income, older populations would
also be expected to have higher levels of morbidity, and so
differences in QALYs may also be small.
Therefore, although our results are embedded with many
assumptions, it is not immediately clear whether these are likely
to lead to our estimates of k being positively or negatively biased.
These results should be regarded as only a ﬁrst attempt to
inform this area of crucial policy importance. Further empirical
evidence is required to inform decision makers’ understanding
of k.
Although correlations between health care expenditure and
health are well established, estimates of the causal effect of
expenditure on health are few. Analysis of cross-country data
could be used to inform international estimates of the marginal
productivity of health care spending, and to estimate the income
elasticity of k and estimate k for different countries, reﬂecting
their demographic characteristics, epidemiology, health expendi-
ture, income, and other covariates [35].
Within-country research could take a number of forms. When
data are available, the analysis of Claxton et al. could be repeated.
Econometric analyses of policy reforms and other natural experi-
ments could also inform estimates of the marginal productivity
of health spending. Another approach could be to explore the
cost-effectiveness of interventions that are at present provided
within a country and those falling outside of the budget envelope.
In this way, policymakers can undergo a process of “threshold
seeking” [36] and become more informed about k as the number
of CEAs in their jurisdiction increases. One example of a study
using an approach similar to this is from Malawi, which suggests
a threshold of no more (and perhaps less) than $150 in that
country [37], which is within the range ($3–$116) estimated here.
Countries could also examine speciﬁc disinvestment opportuni-
ties to understand the health likely to be displaced by new
investments. Similarly, where spending is made up of a relatively
small number of interventions, a mathematical programming
approach may be feasible [38,39]. This approach identiﬁes the
optimal set of interventions to adopt from a given budget. The
ICER of the least cost-effective funded intervention provides an
estimate of the CET.
Most importantly, any research intended to inform CETs
should focus on estimating the opportunity cost of health care
spending, that is, should focus on k and not v. As more empirical
evidence emerges for speciﬁc countries, there may also be value
in synthesizing this information to provide better-informed
extrapolations across countries.Conclusions
To date there have been no estimates of opportunity-cost-based
CETs (ks) for low- or middle-income countries. This article draws
out the implications of the limited available evidence to estimate
opportunity-cost–based CETs for a range of countries. The overall
conclusion is that the balance of evidence suggests that CETs
used to date—such as the WHO estimates—are too high and
should not be used to inform resource allocation decisions.
Further research is needed to inform this key but neglected
question. In the meantime, decision makers may want to use
estimates generated here alongside country-speciﬁc information
on the opportunity cost of health care funds to inform their
resource allocation decisions.
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